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Between 2002 and 2012 the average annual GDP growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
was 5.6 percent. This is a high figure compared to the developed world, but the region fared 
worse compared to some other developing regions. In developing Asia the average annual 
growth rate of GDP was 8.5 percent over the same period. Different trade patterns may 
explain some of the differences in economic performance. The SSA exports are much less 
diversified and heavily based on commodities. Many SSA countries are indeed very 
dependent on their natural resources. Over the period from 2006 to 2010, eight SSA countries 
had a mineral and oil share of exports exceeding 80 percent of the total. Ten SSA countries 
had more than one fifth of their entire revenues stemming from natural resource extraction 
(World Economic Forum, 2013).  
Demand for mineral commodities has increased dramatically since the turn of the 21
st
 century 
and it is largely driven by the expanding Chinese economy (UNECA, 2011).
1
 According to 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), many market observers believe 
that metal prices are in an early phase of a “super cycle”.  Alan Heap defines such a super 
cycle as “…a prolonged (decades) trend rise in real commodity prices, driven by the 
urbanization and industrialization of a major economy” (Heap, 2005).  SSA nations have 
significant reserves and production of minerals in global terms, even though parts of the 
continent is not geologically surveyed, and the continent as a whole is considered 
underexplored (UNECA, 2011). Bearing the positive market expectations in mind, this wealth 
holds the potential for great economic and social development.  
Intuitively, abundance of natural resources should be positive for any country, but whether 
this is the case actually turns out to be a controversial issue, and the body of literature on the 
subject is extensive. “The natural resource curse” refers to the negative relationship some 
researchers have found between natural resource abundance and economic growth (e.g. Sachs 
& Warner, 1995; Gylfason, Herbertsson, & Zoega, 1999; Gylfason & Zoega, 2006).
2
 Others 
have found results conflicting the existence of a resource curse (e.g. Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; 
Doppelhofer, Miller, & Sala-I-Martin, 2004; Sala-I-Martin, 1997). Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik 
                                                 
1
 From 2000 to 2007, China more than doubled their share of global demand for aluminum, copper and zinc, 
tripled that for lead and quadrupled that of nickel. 
2
 The natural resource curse is also known as “the paradox of plenty”. 
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(2006), using the same data as Sachs & Warner (1995), found that whether natural resources 
turns out to be a curse or a blessing depends on institutional quality.  
Usually, it is suggested that natural resources lead to some phenomenon – some transmission 
mechanism - which in turn affects economic performance. Many such transmission 
mechanisms have been investigated. Natural resources have been linked with the Dutch 
disease
3
 (e.g. Sachs & Warner, 1995; Ismail, K., 2010), risk of conflict (e.g. Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Humphreys, M., 2005), corruption (e.g. Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Isham, 
Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005), democracy
4
 (Ross, 2001) and female labor 
participation/patriarchy (Ross, 2008) to name but a few of the cited potential culprits in the 
resource curse literature (for an overview see Frankel, 2010 or van der Ploeg, 2011).  
Common for all aforementioned research is that they are at the national level. Further insight 
may be gained by studying local area effects of natural resources and, more recently, there has 
been a surge of such studies. Natural resources have been linked with conflicts in Colombia 
(Angrist & Kugler, 2008; Dube & Vargas, 2013) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(De Luca, Matstadt, Sekeris, & Ulimwengu, 2012). Mineral extraction has been linked with 
localized Dutch disease effects in Peru (Aragón & Rud, 2013) and in SSA it has led to 
increased female service sector employment (Kotsadam & Tolonen, 2013) and therefore 
possibly increased gender equality.  
The focus in this thesis is on yet another transmission mechanism, namely worsening 
institutions.
5
 Although measuring the quantitative effect of institutional quality on economic 
performance is very difficult, there is not much doubt in the direction of the effect; better 
institutions yield greater economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). 
Thus, any positive effect on the economy from an increase in income originating from natural 
resource extraction, could potentially be offset by a reduction in institutional quality. Studies 
on the effect of natural resources on institutional quality are also conflicting. For example, 
                                                 
3
 The name «Dutch Disease» was inspired by the experiences of the Netherlands after their natural gas 
discoveries in the late 1950s. It refers to possible negative side effects of a natural resource boom. Such a boom, 
due to for example new mineral discoveries or an increased world market price in a commodity, can cause 
deindustrialization in the manufacturing sector because of real appreciation of the currency and a shift in labor 
and land because of increased returns in the non-tradable sector (Frankel, 2010). 
4
 There are two broad approaches to the question of democracy and economic growth. In the first democracy is 
the foundation for growth (securing property rights are essential). In the other a democracy can develop only 
after human- and physical capital accumulation. Property rights are still essential, but they can be upheld by 
dictatorships as well. In this second approach, democracy would not be that relevant for economic growth. For 
more on this issue see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2004).  
5
 For a definition of institutions see section 2.2.2. 
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Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby (2005) and Sachs & Warner (1995) found negative 
effects, while Alexeev & Conrad (2009), after correcting for what they argue gives a negative 
bias, find no negative effect. There are numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, that 
have found negative effects of natural resources on factors often included in measures of 
institutional quality. Some of this literature is covered in section 2.3.1. 
In my thesis, I study the effect of large scale mining on children’s vaccination probabilities in 
29 SSA countries between 1990 and 2011. Following Berger (2009), vaccinations may be 
used as a proxy for institutional quality.
6
 As such, this thesis represents a contribution to the 
already large literature on the relationship between natural resources and institutions. A 
common factor in the majority of empirical studies on the relationship between natural 
resources and institutional quality is that they are done at the national level. This study aims 
to shed some light on what happens at the local level. Geo-coded vaccination data from 
several rounds of household surveys are combined with geo-coded longitudinal mining data to 
examine the local effect of mining on vaccinations using a difference-in-difference regression 
analysis. The analysis is performed using the statistical software STATA. This study shows 
that children’s probability of being fully vaccinated – a measure of the quality of the routine 
vaccination program - decreased in mining areas once a mine opened. From this we may infer 
that mining worsened local institutional quality if vaccinations are accepted as a good proxy 
for institutions. The negative effect diminishes with distance to the mines and is statistically 
significant up to the point where the mine footprint area is defined as 25 kilometers. This 
result is robust to all time in-variant differences between the mining and non-mining areas, 
migration, different geographical definitions of the mining area, and geographically restricting 
the control area. Unresolved issues related to migration, health provision by mining 
companies, pre-production activity of mining companies, and unobserved time-varying 
factors are highlighted as possible problems with the analysis. 
                                                 
6
 The explanation of what a proxy variable is, and the justification for using vaccinations as a proxy for 




2.1 Mining in Africa 
Mining for metallic and non-metallic minerals has taken place in Africa since long before the 
colonial period, with considerable production of iron, copper, gold and salts. Desired control 
over natural resources was one of the main objectives of the colonization and the minerals 
were largely exported in raw form. Traditional mining dominated up until the 1870s when the 
patterns of production changed dramatically as foreign mining companies took over much of 
the production. The indigenous population was restricted from access to mineral rights and 
high wage jobs as foreign labor was imported. This added even more “enclave industry” 
features (UNECA, 2011). The term “enclave industry” is commonly used to describe 
industries that have few or no upstream and downstream linkages with the rest of the local 
economy. To this day, enclave mining is still very much on the agenda in Africa. According 
to UNECA (2011), the African mining sector’s key characteristics and challenges are those of 
an enclave industry.  
Africa has production and reserves of many minerals that are significant in world terms. Some 
examples are bauxite, chromium, cobalt, gold, manganese, phosphate, platinum, titanium and 
diamonds (UNECA, 2011). Many SSA countries are very dependent on their natural 
resources. Over the period from 2006 to 2010, eight SSA countries had mineral and oil share 
of exports exceeding 80 percent of the total and ten SSA countries had more than one fifth of 
their entire revenues stemming from natural resource extraction (World Economic Forum, 
2013). 
The investment-to-GDP ratio in SSA as a whole has had a positive trend in the last 20 years. 
In 2012 it was about 22 percent. Although the trend is positive, this is the lowest investment-
to-GDP ratio of any developing region in the world (World Economic Forum, 2013). Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has also had a positive trend in SSA, with the extractive sector 
receiving the bulk of investments.
7
 In 2012 FDI was at $41.1 billion – above the level before 
the financial crises. Figure 1 shows the development in FDI in SSA since 1970, based on 
                                                 
7
 Foreign direct investment refers to investments to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise 
operating in an economy outside the country of the investor.   
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figures from UNCTAD.  By 2015 FDI is expected to reach $54 billion (The World Bank, 
2013a). 
Figure 1. FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa in billion US$ at current prices and exchange rates (1970-2012) 
 
Source: Authors own. Data from UNCTAD. 
A survey performed by the World Bank revealed that mining companies consider mineral 
potential and existing infrastructure as key decision variables for investments (i.e. opening a 
new mine site or expanding on an existing one). Other important factors found were a stable 
legal and fiscal framework, contractual stability, a guaranteed fiscal regime, assured profit 
repatriation, and easy access to foreign exchange (The World Bank, 1992; UNECA, 2011). 
The decision variables for mineral exploration are the same by extension. The budget for 
mineral exploration in Africa accounted for only 13 percent of the total world-wide budget in 
2010. Electricity shortages and regional unrest limited exploration activity in some areas 
(U.S.Geological Survey, 2012). Large parts of Africa have not been geologically surveyed 
and the continent is considered to be under-explored as a whole (UNECA, 2011). Exploration 
in Africa is still in early development compared to other regions, with a greater focus on 
exploring new areas as opposed to expanding on previously identified ones (U.S.Geological 
Survey, 2012).  
Demand for mineral commodities has increased dramatically since the turn of the 21
st
 century 
and it is largely driven by the expanding Chinese economy. India and Brazil are other 
populous nations who have had a large growth rate in metal use (UNECA, 2011). According 
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to UNECA many market observers believe that metal prices are in an early phase of a “super 
cycle”. Alan Heap defines such a super cycle as “…a prolonged (decades) trend rise in real 
commodity prices, driven by the urbanization and industrialization of a major economy” 
(Heap, 2005). By 2020 it is expected that only four or five countries in the region are not 
engaged in mineral resource extraction (The World Bank, 2013a). 
The vast mineral resource wealth in SSA, if managed properly, could finance economic and 
social development in many currently poor, resource-rich nations. 
2.2 Vaccination in sub-Saharan Africa 
Vaccinations are commonly considered to be the “best buy” for the health sector, so it may 
seem as a puzzle that financing vaccinations is problematic (Kaddar, Lydon, & Levine, 2004). 
Arguably, immunization coverage is critical to socio-economic development. Astounding 
progress has been made in SSA since the birth of WHO’s Expanded Program on 
Immunization in 1974, but the progress has not been steady. Immunization rates skyrocketed 
in the 80s only to decline in the 90s. Table 1 shows the development in immunization rates in 
SSA since 1980. Though there has been great progress, immunization coverage from routine 
vaccinations is lagging in many SSA nations compared to other developing regions, despite 
the concerted efforts of the WHO and UNICEF. In the 27
th
 resolution of the United Nations  
Table 1. Immunization coverage estimates in percentage from selected antigens in sub-Saharan Africa (1980-
2010) 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
BCG 10 73 67 85 
DPT1 <10 76 66 84 
DPT3 <10 56 52 74 
Polio3 <10 56 53 78 
Measles <10 56 53 75 
Source: Brown, Burton, Gacic-Dobo, & Karimov (2012). Data is from WHO and UNICEF. The numbers behind 
the vaccine names refer to the specific dose of vaccination, i.e., DPT3 is the third (and final) dose of the primary 
series of the combination vaccine DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus). 
General Assembly, a proclaimed goal was that 90 percent of all children under the age of one 
year should be fully immunized by 2010 (U.N General Assembly, 2002). This goal is yet to 
be achieved in SSA. 
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Africa still relies heavily on external financing of their immunization programs. The simple 
average of the proportion of government funding in routine vaccination was 52 percent for the 
continent as a whole in 2010. The share of government funding has increased only slightly in 
the last decade (Politi & Sagna, 2011).  
Central to this thesis, with regard to whether immunization of children can be considered as a 
proxy for local institutional quality, and for interpreting results, is the degree of involvement 
by local level governments in immunization. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a 
significant role in the provision of immunization in SSA, but much less of a role than in 
financing. The extent of NGOs involvement is not well documented. Neither is how exactly 
they operate in relation to the national programs or to whom they provide vaccines (Gaulé & 
Kaddar, 2003). Private for-profit providers also play a role and they operate more 
independently of the national programs. Based on an e-mail survey of all UNICEF  and Pan 
American Health Organization country offices, DeRoeck & Levine (1998) estimated that in 
SSA, 26 percent of all immunization was provided by private for-profit operators and NGOs 
combined.  
Since around the time of independence, and from the 1970s and onwards, many African 
nations have become more decentralized (Mills, Smith, Vaughan, & Tabibzadeh, 1990).
8
 
Decentralization may be broadly defined as the transfer of public authority, resources and 
personnel to sub-national levels. The degree and form of decentralization varies across 
countries (Ndegwa, 2002) and the process has not been linear. Decentralization in the health 
sector has often been a part of a broader reform and it has been widely advocated by the 
WHO and other organizations (Mills et al., 1990). Decentralization reforms in general have 
been funded by USAID, WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank (Beauvais & Bossert, 2002). 
Between 1993 and 1997, 19 percent of the World Bank projects in Africa had some 
decentralization component (Junaid, Bird, & Litvack, 1998). Ndegwa (2002) found that 15 
out of 30 analyzed African countries exhibited a moderate or high degree of political 
decentralization and 12 out of 30 countries had moderate or high administrative 
decentralization. The levels of fiscal decentralization found were lower. Decentralization has 
been one of the most popular forms of health reform in SSA (Gilson & Mills, 1995), and all 
of the 46 countries in WHOs Africa Region have reformed their health systems (Lambo & 
Sambo, 2003).  
                                                 
8
 For an overview of the history of decentralization in Africa see Olowu (2001). 
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Given the degree of decentralization in general, the amount of reforms in the health sector in 
particular and the WHO emphasis on decentralization specifically in the health sector, the 
significance of local governments in immunization provision in SSA is unquestionable, 
though showing great variation across time and space. It is unfortunately out of the scope of 
this thesis to gather data to control for whether the local districts in each country at each time 
of survey had responsibility for immunization. 
2.2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
It is possible to trace business’s societal concerns centuries back. The concept of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has been defined in several ways since the formal writings on the 
subject emerged in the 1950s (Carroll, 1999). However it is defined, and whatever motivates 
it, what matters is that businesses in SSA engage in activities that do not directly increase 
profits and that are of benefit to the local communities – health provision included. A survey 
of 85 companies spread across six SSA countries showed that health projects were the second 
most common manifestation of CSR after education (GTZ, 2009). Mining companies are no 
exception to this tendency. A survey of 12 SSA countries revealed a variety of health projects 
initiated by mining companies (GIZ, 2012).  
Despite CSR still being in its infancy in SSA (GTZ, 2009), the evidence suggests that some 
mining companies are directly providing immunization to the local communities. This 
potential provision may be negligible in SSA as a whole, or even at the national scale, but 
locally, in close proximity to the mines, CSR is possibly a significant contributor to children’s 
immunization. Therefore CSR poses a real threat to my identification strategy. Any positive 
effects on vaccinations from mining found in this thesis must be interpreted with caution. 
However, any negative effects on vaccination will be in spite of the CSR, adding significance 




2.2.2 Vaccinations as a Proxy for Institutions 
In my thesis I analyze the effect of mining on children’s probability of being vaccinated. 
Immunization is important and valuable in and of itself, and it is arguably important for 
economic performance and social development. Hence, any results found in my analysis are 
interesting without further interpretation. However, my main interest lies with the effect of 
mining on institutional quality. In this section I will argue that any effect of mining on 
vaccinations may be interpreted as an effect on local institutional quality. This relationship 
cannot be examined directly as there exists no good measure of local institutional quality in 
SSA. Because institutional quality is unobserved, I exploit the supposed correlation between 
the observed vaccination and institutional quality. Provided that vaccination fulfills certain 
criteria discussed more in depth below, it can take the place of institutions in my regression 
analysis. In that case we can assume that vaccinations are a good proxy for institutions. 
The use of vaccinations as a proxy for institutional quality is inspired by a study by Daniel 
Berger (2009) on the effect of different colonial policies on institutional quality in Nigeria. 
Comparing households living on either side of the historical North-South border - that does 
not correspond to any modern state or provincial border, he finds that vaccination rates are 
lower on the side where the historical taxation system was less developed. His interpretation 
is that in the areas where the local governments had to collect taxes institutions had to be 
developed. This increased institutional quality persists to this day as measured by the higher 
vaccination rates. 
Institutions are the profound game rules of society on which all activity is based. North (1994) 
defines institutions as: 
… the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made 
up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of 
behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. 
Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies (page 
360). 
For vaccination rates to be a good proxy for institutional quality at the local level three criteria 
must be fulfilled. First, institutions and vaccinations should be strongly correlated. I offer no 
evidence that this criterion is fulfilled, but a strong positive correlation is reasonable to 
assume. Section 2.2 shows the significant involvement of local governments in immunization 
provision in SSA. A successful immunization program would require the willingness and 
10 
 
ability of the local government. Corruption, government inefficiency, breech of contracts and 
security are just a few of the classical measures of institutional quality that should affect these 
requirements.
9
 Second, there should not be much measurement error in the vaccination data. 
This criterion is fulfilled as the DHS data is highly trustworthy, and because there is no 
quality/quantity trade-off in vaccination. One is clearly either vaccinated or not. As a 
robustness test I will restrict the sample to only include children for whom the DHS 
interviewer has seen a vaccination card. Third, if proximity to mining correlates with factors 
that affect vaccination, these factors must be controlled for. Non-random mine placement is 
perhaps the greatest threat to my identification strategy. There is self-selection into being a 
mining area with infrastructure being of key importance. Better infrastructure is likely to have 
a positive effect on vaccination. The threat of selection into being a mining area is at least in 
part dealt with by using a difference-in-difference strategy which removes all unobserved 
time in-variant characteristics. The empirical issues are discussed in detail in section four. An 
additional concern is that of CSR as explained in the previous subsection. 
Intuitively, institutional change is a gradual process. Institutions are commonly thought to be 
durable and persistent, hence the use of historical instruments as, for example, in the classical 
paper by Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001). Berger (2009) also emphasises the 
persistence of institutions. Table 1 shows that immunization coverage in SSA has increased 
very quickly since the 80s and has shown relatively large swings over time. Glaeser, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2004) investigate three different measures of institutional 
quality used in econometric analysis in several influential papers.
10
 They argue that two of the 
measures are unusable as a measure of institutions as defined by North because they do not 
capture constraints. A dictator choosing the correct policies can receive the highest 
evaluations using these measures. All three measures are highly GDP-dependent and show 
great volatility. This goes against the common notion and our intuition of institutional change 
as a gradual process. In light of this critisism interpreting changes in immunization rates as 
institutional change may be misleading. Simply put any effect on vaccination rates from 
mining found in my analysis may happen too quickly for it to be interpreted as institutional 
change. 
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 See section 2.3.1 for more on measures of institutional quality. 
10
 The authors list Knack & Keefer (1995), Hall & Jones (1999) , Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001) and  
Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi (2004). 
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2.3 The Resource Curse 
A seminal paper in this field of studies is “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth” by Sachs & Warner, published first as a working paper in 1995. In a cross-section 
analysis of 79 developing countries, Sachs & Warner (1995) found that natural resource 
abundance had a negative effect on GDP growth rates over the period 1971-1989. Several 
other cross-sectional studies have provided empirical support to this finding (e.g. Gylfason, 
Herbertsson, & Zoega, 1999; Gylfason & Zoega, 2006).
11
 Other cross-sectional analyses have 
not supported a resource curse unambiguously. For example Sala-I-Martin (1997) and 
Doppelhofer, Miller, & Sala-I-Martin (2004) found that a higher mining share of GDP affects 
economic growth positively.  
Alexeev & Conrad (2009) dismiss the findings of Sachs & Warner (1995) and other previous 
literature and find no evidence of a resource curse. On the contrary, they say “the effect of a 
large endowment of oil and other mineral resources on long-term economic growth of 
countries has been on balance positive (p. 586)”. A problem with most of the previous 
literature, as pointed out by Alexeev & Conrad (2009), is that its measures of natural resource 
abundance and natural resource dependence are endogenous and will cause bias in favor of 
the existence of a resource curse. The reason for this is that, given a level of natural resource 
output, countries which, for whatever reason are performing poorly economically will be 
measured as more resource abundant when the natural resource share of GDP is used. The 
natural resource share of total exports as a measure of natural resource dependence suffers 
from a similar problem, but in addition, countries that are more industrialized process and 
consume more of their own natural resources and is therefore measured as less resource 
dependent. After correcting this they find that natural resources have had a positive effect on 
economic growth. 
In short, the evidence of the natural resource curse’s existence is conflicting. While resource 
abundant countries on average have been growth losers (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006), 
there are examples of nations across time and space with great natural resource abundance 
that have been growth winners. To name but a few; Norway, USA, Botswana and Chile have 
all been successful “despite of” natural resource abundance.  
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 Sachs & Warner’s (1995) preferred measure of natural resource dependence was the ratio of primary-product 
exports to GDP. For robustness they test the share of mineral production in GDP, the fraction of primary exports 
in total exports and the log of land area per person. 
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Quoting Frankel (2010): 
Few would think that a country with oil or other natural resources would be better off 
destroying them or refraining from developing them. Resource-rich countries can succeed. 
The question is why does oil lead to success in some cases and failure in others (2010, p. 13) 
2.3.1 Institutions and the Resource Curse 
Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006) divides the literature on the relationship between 
institutions and the resource curse into three strands. One in which natural resources interacts 
with institutional quality; another, in which institutions have a neutral/unimportant role; and a 
third, in which institutions are an intermediate causal link – or transmission mechanism – for 
the resource curse.  
Within the first strand we find Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006). They reason that destructive 
rent-seeking activities depend on institutional quality and illustrate it with a simple model. 
Entrepreneurs can choose between rent-seeking and producing activities. The profitability of 
destructive rent-seeking activities on the part on the entrepreneurs depends on institutional 
quality. If institutions are bad – or “grabber-friendly” – profitability from rent-seeking outside 
the productive economy is higher than when institutions are good – or “producer-friendly”. 
The model predicts that natural resources increase the entrepreneurs’ income and the total 
production when institutions are producer friendly, but decrease income and total production 
when institutions are grabber-friendly. The model is tested empirically by using the same data 
and methodology as Sachs & Warner (1995), but including an interaction term between 
institutional quality and resource abundance. The interaction term is significantly positive, 
which supports the model’s prediction that there is only a resource curse when the institutions 
are grabber-friendly. Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier (2006) develop a political economy model 
that gives a similar conclusion as Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2006): A resource curse may 
exist when institutional quality is low. They study an incumbent politician that can influence 
the probability of being reelected by offering inefficient public sector jobs. In the absence of 
institutions that limit the power of the incumbent to bias elections by such distribution of 
patronage, a resource boom may lead to a resource curse. The model also predicts an 
improved resource extraction path because the discount factor of the incumbent is equal to the 
probability that he is reelected. Compared to the social optimum, the politician undervalues 
future income from the natural resources since he only cares about the future resource income 
13 
 
if he is reelected. The patronage increases his probability to be reelected which moves 
resource extraction closer to the socially optimal extraction path. These results hold for 
permanent or anticipated future resource booms.  
Within the second strand we find the previously mentioned Sachs & Warner (1995). They did 
find a negative association between resource abundance and institutional quality, but deemed 
it unimportant in explaining the resource curse. Alexeev & Conrad (2009) argue that all 
previous findings from cross-country analyses on the effect of natural resources on 
institutional quality suffer the same negative bias. The negative bias arises from the use of 
“initial GDP” as a control variable in the regressions. Initial GDP was included by Sachs & 
Warner (1995) because it has been “found to be important for economic growth (1995, p. 
1)”.12 The initial year used is usually 1970. However, as Alexeev & Conrad (2009) show, 
most major resource extracting countries had been doing so since well before 1970 and they 
have on average higher GDP levels. Because of the positive relationship between natural 
resources and per capita GDP, and between per capita GDP and institutions, including initial 
GDP drives down the estimated effect of natural resources. To bypass this problem Alexeev 
& Conrad (2009) predict initial GDP as of 1970 by using absolute latitude and dummies for 
European population, Latin America and East Asia. They run the regression analysis of 
natural resources on institutional quality replacing initial GDP in 1970 with the predicted 
values, and find no significant effect of natural resources on institutions. 
The last strand – institutions as a transmission mechanism - is the focus of this thesis. 
Measuring the quantitative effect of institutional quality on economic performance is very 
difficult, but there is not much doubt in the direction of the effect; better institutions yield 
greater economic development. Thus, any positive effect on the economy from an increase in 
income originating from natural resource extraction could potentially be offset by a reduction 
in institutional quality. The measures on institutional quality in the literature vary, but 
commonly the measure is an index constructed from a range of variables. For example, the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators  (used by Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi (2004) and 
others), consist of data on 215 countries describing six dimensions of governance: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The data has been gathered from 31 
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 Initial GDP level is important in neo-classical growth models. In the Solow model a country with a lower 
income level has a higher income growth all else equal. 
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different sources (The World Bank, 2013b). An effect from natural resources on any or all of 
these dimensions of governance can be interpreted as an effect on institutional quality. In the 
following paragraph I introduce a few of a large number of studies relevant to institutions as a 
transmission mechanism for a resource curse.  
Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby (2005) found, in a cross-country regression analysis, a 
negative effect on six out of six measures of institutions from “point source” natural resource 
extraction.
13
 Point source resources are natural resources “extracted from a narrow geographic 
or economic base (2005, page 143)” like, for example, most minerals and oil. Ross (2001) 
shows, using time series data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997, that both oil wealth and 
mineral wealth have impeded democratization in this period. The measures of natural 
resources used are export values as shares of GDP.  The study provides tentative evidence of 
three mechanisms for the impeded democratization: a “rentier state” effect (resource rich 
countries can afford to have low taxes and distribute patronage), a repression effect (resource 
rich countries can afford security) and a modernization effect (resource extraction inhibits 
social and cultural development). Collier & Hoeffler (2004) study factors that influence the 
risk of conflict in 123 countries over the period 1960 to 1999. They find that a higher primary 
commodity dependence, measured as the ratio of the value of primary commodity exports to 
GDP, significantly increased the risk of conflict. Dube & Vargas (2013) study how price 
shocks have affected the risk of conflict in Colombian municipalities from 1988 to 2005. 
They find that a negative price shock to coffee increased the risk of conflict more in 
municipalities that produce coffee. The result is consistent with the theory of opportunity cost 
as a mechanism for conflict as coffee is labor intensive, and a negative price shock on coffee 
leads to decreased wages. On the other hand, a positive price shock in less labor intensive 
industries, foremost oil, but also non-fuel minerals, led to an increase in conflicts in 
municipalities that produce them. This result is consistent with rapacity, i.e fighting over 
resource rents, as a link between resources and conflicts. De Luca, Matstadt, Sekeris, & 
Ulimwengu (2012) study how mineral mining affected conflicts in Congo in the period 1997-
2007. They instrument for mineral mining by using historical mining concession data and the 
world market mineral prices over the period of 1997-2007. The study finds that in areas close 
to mining there is no significant increase in conflicts, but it does find an effect using a larger 
geographical definition of the mining footprint area. Caselli & Michaels (2013) find that oil 
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 The six institutional variables were “rule of law”, “political stability”, “government efficiency”, “absence of 
corruption”, “regulatory framework” and “property rights and rule-based governance”. 
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abundance in Brazilian municipalities - measured by oil output - caused increased reported 
public spending. However, survey data showed little or no increase in services provided. The 
authors provide tentative evidence pointing towards corruption as the cause. Brollo, 
Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini (2010) study a model of how windfall income affects 
corruption and the quality of political candidates. In the model, increased income leads to 
more corruption on the part of the incumbent politician and a reduction in quality of the pool 
of political candidates. Corruption increases because the public is assumed to be imperfectly 
informed. Therefore, the incumbent is able to grab more rents without disappointing the 
public. The quality of political candidates decreases because politicians of lower quality are 
assumed to be more concerned about how much rents they can grab. The model also predicts 
that the probability that the incumbent is reelected increases. The model is tested by means of 
a regression discontinuity analysis of Brazilian municipalities. Brazilian municipalities 
receive central funding according to their population size. Comparing municipalities just 
below and just above the income jumps, the study finds empirical evidence supporting all 




In order to examine local area effects on vaccination from mining in SSA, geo-coded datasets 
from Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use Results Demographic and Health Surveys 
(MeasureDHS or DHS) and Intierra Raw Minerals Group (IntierraRMG) are merged. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mining Variables     
distancemine1 
Distance from respondent to nearest mine in 
kilometers 
277956 241.67 210.83 
active25 
1 if at least one active mine is within 25 
kilometers of respondent 
277956 0.021 0.144 
inactive25 
1 if at least one inactive mine is within 25 
kilometers of respondent 
273522 0.007 0.082 
suspended25 
1 if at least one suspended mine is within 25 
kilometers of respondent 
277956 0.016 0.125 
Main Independent 
Variables 
       
child1anyvacc 1 if last born child has received any vaccine 277956 0.836 0.369 
child1fullvacc 1 if last born child is fully vaccinated 277956 0.379 0.485 
child2anyvacc 
1 if second last born child has received any 
vaccine 
101613 0.853 0.354 
child2fullvacc 1 if second last born child is fully vaccinated 101613 0.479 0.500 
anychildvacc 
1 if a mother has at least one child that has 
received a vaccine 
277956 0.872 0.334 
allchildvacc 
1 if a mother has all her children are fully 
vaccinated 
277956 0.356 0.479 
Control Variables        
age Respondent’s age in years 277956 28.72 7.243 
christian 1 if respondent is Christian 250413 0.557 0.497 
muslim 1 if respondent is Muslim 257459 0.375 0.484 
        
Mechanisms        
urban 1 if respondent lives in urban environment 277956 0.267 0.442 
schoolyears Number of years of schooling 277800 3.459 4.086 
working 1 f respondent is currently working 277684 0.686 0.464 
        
non_mover 1 if respondent has never moved 212908 0.427 0.495 
 
The longitudinal mining data allows construction of indicators for whether a mine is currently 
producing (active), not yet producing (inactive) or has stopped producing (suspended). From 





 Then, for each woman in the DHS data using the DHS cluster GPS-coordinates, 
an indicator variable is generated for whether she lives within the constructed concentric 
circles around an active mine at the time of the survey. If she is not, the same procedure is 
done for inactive mines. If the woman does not live within any of the constructed circles 
around an active or inactive mine, she is labeled as living in a non-mining area. On average 
the respondents live about 235 kilometers from the closest mine, either active, inactive or 
suspended. About 2.32 percent of the respondents live within 25 kilometers of an active mine, 
0.69 percent live within 25 kilometers of an inactive mine and 1.7 percent live within 25 
kilometers of a suspended mine at the time of the survey.  
3.1 DHS Data 
MeasureDHS is a project funded by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and other donors, and implemented by ICF International. They provide technical assistance to 
surveys performed in the developing world with the goal of advancing global understanding 
of health and population trends.  
The data used is from the Demographic and Health Surveys. These are household surveys of 
women that are standardized across time and space, and performed by trained interviewers in-
person. The participating women are grouped in clusters ranging in size from 1 to 108, spread 
across 297 sub-national regions.
15
 In most surveys the clusters have been geo-coded. Only the 
surveys that have been geo-coded are used in this research. In order to maintain anonymity a 
small random error in the GPS-coordinates is introduced.
16
 The errors are contained within 
country and region. Since the errors in the GPS-coordinates are random, they do not pose a 
threat to the identification strategy. 
In total 625 141 women between the ages 15 and 49 have participated in the 59 surveys used 
in my analysis. The surveys are from 29 countries and were performed between 1990 and 
2011.
17
 Figure 2 shows the spread of DHS clusters across SSA from 1986 to 2011. 
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 The radii’s, in kilometers, are 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50, 75, 100 and 200. 
15
 The number of women in each sub-national region range from 30 to 23 007. 
16
 Urban clusters contain a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 2 kilometers of error. Rural clusters contain a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 5 kilometers of positional error with a further 1% of the rural clusters 
displaced a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10 kilometers. 
17
 Table A.1 in the appendix shows the list of countries and the corresponding number of survey participants. 
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Figure 2. DHS clusters in sub-Saharan Africa 1986-2011. 
Source: Kotsadam & Tolonen (2013) 
The surveys contain vaccination data on children up to five years old with a maximum of six 
entries per mother. If she has had more than six children in the last five years, the oldest child 
will not be registered. Due to the way the data is constructed, the vaccination data on the 
children is split into whether it is last born child, second last born, third last born etc.
18
 There 
are necessarily more observations on the last born children. 277 956 out of the 625 141 
                                                 
18
 This may be unfortunate as the sample is reduced in each regression. Combining all the children in a single 
regression could potentially produce more significant results.  
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women sampled have had at least one child for whom I have vaccination data. 101 613 have 
had two children and 12 404 have had three children. The last born children are one year and 
four months old on average. The second last born are on average just over three years old. As 
one would expect, the older children have on average received more vaccines (see table 2).  
The dataset contains information on eight different vaccines: measles, BCG, three doses of 
polio and three doses of DPT.
19
 The main independent variables in this thesis are constructed 
from this data. They are indicators for whether a child has received at least one vaccine and 
for whether the child is fully vaccinated. In addition, in order to use as large a sample as 
possible, an indicator variable is constructed for whether a mother has at least one child that 
has at least one vaccine and for whether all her children are fully vaccinated.  
3.2 Resource Data 
The mining data is from IntierraRMG. It contains information on large scale production of 31 
different minerals in 1975 and from 1984 to 2010. The information consists of production 
levels, the type of mineral, the name of the producer and geographical placement by GPS-
coordinates. In total there is information on 874 industrial size mines across Africa. 277 of 
which are matched to a DHS cluster. All DHS clusters are matched to a mine, but not all 
mines are matched to a DHS cluster. This is because some mines are in remote areas and 
because DHS data from a few countries – unfortunately including South Africa – is missing. 
Figure 3 plots RMG mines in Africa from 1975 to 2010.  
Artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) is widespread in SSA. More than 100 000 people are 
employed directly in ASM and associated services in 21 countries (UNECA, 2011). The 
IntierraRMG data is for large scale mining so ASM is not covered. While ASM is definitely 
important for many SSA economies, this thesis is on the connection between mining and 
institutions. Given the nature of ASM it is likely to be of less relevance in this regard, though 
it is possibly important for risk of conflict in certain areas. As an example the FDLR group in 
eastern Congo has been heavily linked with trade in minerals (United Nations Group of 
Experts, 2009). 
Figure 3. RMG mines in Africa 1975-2010. 
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 BCG is short for “Bacillus Calmette–Guérin” – a vaccine against tuberculosis. DPT is a combination vaccine. 
It is an abbreviation of the three diseases for which it provides immunization: diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. 
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In this thesis I analyze the local area effect of mineral extraction on institutional quality. I 
proxy for institutional quality by using different vaccination measures. One way to perform 
such an analysis would be to run a plain ordinary least square (OLS) regression of the form: 
                     
The dependent variable Y (e.g. the probability of last born children being fully vaccinated) for 
individual i, is a function of an indicator for whether the individual lives near an active mine 
or not (Active). If the only thing that matters to mining investment and mineral extraction is 
geology, and geology is random and geological surveying is uncorrelated with everything that 
affects vaccination, then this identification strategy would be sufficient. If this were the case 
we could say that there is no selection into being a mining area. The problem is that these 
conditions are definitely not met. As stated earlier, mining companies make other 
considerations when investing besides geological ones. Consider the other key decision 
variable identified besides geology; existing infrastructure. Existing infrastructure, e.g., roads 
and electricity, is likely to have a positive effect on vaccination directly. Roads are needed for 
outreach-programs and for the population to get to the health centers and hospitals. Electricity 
is needed for the cold chain and for alerting the public about vaccination dates through radio 
broadcasts.
20
 Because mines are placed where the existing infrastructure is good, and 
infrastructure affects vaccination positively, we will get a positive omitted variable bias 
(OVB) on our mining estimate β1. In addition, the quality of the infrastructure is likely to be 
associated with other things that may affect vaccination, like, for example, corruption. We 
could potentially control for infrastructure by adding some measure of it to our regression. 
The OLS regression model would be: 
                                                 
Under this model specification, OVB from infrastructure is gone, but there are further 
problems. In reality we may not have good measures of infrastructure at the local level in 
SSA. But more importantly, in addition to infrastructure, the mining areas may differ from the 
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 Vaccines are very sensitive to temperature. The cold chain refers to the need for vaccines to be kept cool 
(commonly 2°C to 8°C) at all times from production until administration.  
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non-mining areas in a whole range of different ways that have an impact on vaccination. 
There are many potential sources of OVB and we are unable to control for all of them.  
To mediate the overwhelmingly likely OVB, I exploit the longitudinal mining data and the 
different waves of household surveys to do a difference-in-difference regression analysis. The 
temporal variation allows me to examine the impact on vaccination before and after 
“treatment” - treatment in this analysis is mine openings. This is a type of “fixed effects” 
model. The general idea is to exploit variation in vaccination rates within areas over time, 
instead of only exploiting variation in vaccination rates across space. Taking differences 
removes all OVB from unobservable factors (i.e. factors left out of our model) that are 
constant over time.  
The regression model used in this thesis takes the form:  
                                                    
The dependent variable Y for individual i, in region r, in cluster v, at time t, is regressed on 
indicators for whether the individual lives in an active or inactive mining area at the time of 
the survey, region and year fixed effects, region specific linear time trends and a set of 
individual specific control variables. Each individual will fall in one of three categories: She 
lives either within an area defined as being close to active mining (Active), within an area 
defined as being close to where a mine is yet to be active (Inactive) or she will live outside 
these areas. In that case she belongs to the control group. 





















β1 is the difference between the treated and the control group. This estimate is represented by 
the bracket “B” in figure 4. β2 is the difference between the treated group and the control 
group before treatment. Subtracting the β2 estimate from β1 yields a difference-in-difference 
estimate of the effect of mineral extraction on the outcome variable. This estimate 
corresponds to bracket A in figure 4. The hypothesis that β1 – β2 = 0 is tested after each 
regression. The figure represents a case where the mining areas have higher vaccination levels 
than the non-mining areas, but identical trends over time. Interpreting the β1-estimate of 
“Active” as the effect of mining without taking differences would yield the estimate “B” in 
figure 4 as the treatment effect. This would be an overestimation if relevant variables are 
omitted from the regression. 
The difference-in-difference method relies on the assumption that the trends in the outcome 
variable in the mining- and non-mining areas would have been the same absent the mining. 
The method controls for all unobserved fixed effects, but factors that vary over time and 
affect the outcome variable can still cause biased estimates if they vary differently in the 
treatment and control groups. Consider the case of figure 5 below. The trend in the outcome 
variable is greater in the mining areas compared to the control group also absent the mining. 
The difference-in-difference method would fail to take account of the different trends in the 
two groups and would overestimate the treatment effect to be “C” in the figure. The actual 
treatment effect of mining would be “A”. 
















Pre Treatment Post Treatment 
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4.1 Empirical Issues and Robustness tests 
Both for robustness and interpretation, the analysis relies on different definitions of the 
mining area and different restrictions on the control group. In the baseline regression, the 
mining area is defined up to a cut-off of 25 kilometers from a mine, but different distance 
measures ranging from 5 kilometers to 75 kilometers are analyzed. One would expect a 
diminishing impact from mining on the outcome variables as the cut-off distance is increased. 
In a similar way to mine openings, mine closings will also be analyzed to see if any results 
from mine openings are reversed.  
All regressions include controls for the mother’s age and religious beliefs. The mother’s 
degree of urbanization, her education and her employment status are all affected by mining. 
Kotsadam & Tolonen (2013) found that mine openings in SSA between 1990 and 2011 have 
had a negative effect on the likelihood that a woman is working. This decrease in overall 
employment was driven by a decrease in agricultural employment, while employment in 
services partially counteracted the overall negative effect. In the same study they also found 
that mine openings have had a positive effect on women’s length of education. Mining is also 
likely to cause an increased degree of urbanization. Because these three factors may influence 
the mother’s opportunities and choices for immunization of her children, including them in 
the regression may remove some of the effect of mining on vaccinations. Therefore these 
variables are included separately from the other controls as possible mechanisms through 
which mining affects vaccinations. 
Different vaccination measures are used in the analysis. The DPT3 coverage is widely 
regarded as a good measure of the quality of the routine vaccination services (Arevshatian et 
al., 2007). DPT3 is the third dose of the primary series of the DPT vaccination that is 
recommended by WHO to be finished by the age of 6 months. It is used as a 
measure/indicator as it reflects completeness of the routine vaccination to a larger degree than 
any single vaccination shot like for example the BCG. Using the DHS data, an indicator 
variable is constructed that takes the value one if a child has had all eight vaccinations on 
which there is data. DPT3 is included in these eight vaccinations. This measure is certainly 
superior to using the DPT3 vaccination rate alone to judge the quality of the routine 
vaccination program. The indicator variable constructed for whether a child has received at 
least one vaccine may be a better measure of breadth of vaccinations.  
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4.1.1 Unobservable Time-Variant Factors 
The difference-in-difference method employed in this thesis eliminates any OVB from 
unobservable time-invariant factors, but time-varying factors still pose a problem. The 
assumption that the trends in the outcome variable in the mining- and non-mining areas would 
have been the same, absent the mining, cannot be confirmed. It can never be ruled out that 
something unobserved varies differently over time in the treatment and control groups, and 
that this is driving any results found in a difference-in-difference model. Several measures are 
taken to reduce the danger of any bias that might arise from such factors. 
Migration may be such an unobserved factor and it poses a real threat. The household survey 
data on vaccination is not panel data. Implicitly I am assuming that the population before and 
after treatment is the same. However, a mine opening may induce work migration en masse. 
These migrants, and the places from which they come, may have different characteristics that 
are unobserved and affect vaccination of children. To control for this the sample will be 
restricted to those who have never moved in their life. About 42,7 percent of the mothers in 
my sample have never moved. Restricting the sample to non-movers should largely remove 
the danger of bias from migration, but there are further problems. First, moving requires the 
need or want to move and the ability to overcome obstacles such as a lack of information 
about places to move to, monetary costs and family attachments (Parnwell, 1993). Non-
movers may therefore share certain characteristics so that the results from this sub-population 
cannot be generalized. Second, the people who comprise the community around the non-
movers may change dramatically if there is large inward or outward migration, and this may 
affect the non-mover’s vaccination choices. As an example of such community effects on 
individual’s choices; Kravdal (2002) showed, using DHS data from SSA, that the average 
educational level of a community had a significant negative effect on a woman’s birth rate net 
of her own education and degree of urbanization.  
Regional time trends are included in each regression. This allows for the trends in the 
outcome variables to be different across regions, thus reducing the danger of unequal trends 
from unobserved factors. 
Despite of taking these measures, a fear still exists that the treatment and control groups are 
too dissimilar and therefore have different trends. Therefore the control group will be 




This section describes the results of my analysis using the empirical strategy outlined in 
section four. The main results of the baseline regressions are shown in table 3 and table 4. The 
baseline regressions have mining areas defined to a cut-off of 25 kilometers. In the following 
subsections possible mechanisms are investigated and different robustness tests are 
performed. 
Table 3 and 4 show the relationship between the explanatory variables – active25 and 
inactive25 being those of main interest - and the probability that last born and second last 
born children respectively have received at least one vaccine and for them to have been fully 
vaccinated. The explanatory variables are organized by rows and the explained variables – 
under different regression specifications - by columns. In all regressions controls are added 
for the mother’s age and religious beliefs. Results are shown with and without geographically 
restricting the control group to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. This restriction is done 
to reduce potential dissimilarity in the trends between the two groups at the cost of losing 
about half of the sample. The estimated effect of mining is the difference between the 
coefficients for the variables active25 and inactive25. The coefficients for these variables are 
the estimated difference in vaccination probabilities associated with living within 25 
kilometers of an active/producing mine or an inactive/future mine compared to living further 
away. The result of the F-test of whether this difference is statistically significant is provided 
after each regression along with the associated p-value. The p-value is the probability that the 
null hypothesis                       is true given the estimates found in the analysis. 
Thus a low p-value means that there is a high probability that there is an effect of mining. 
The first regression in each table examines the effect of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of having received at least one vaccine, without geographical restrictions on the 
control group. There is a significant positive correlation between living in an active mining 
area and the probability of having received at least one vaccine. Last born children in active 
mining areas had an estimated 3.2 percentage points higher probability while the estimate for 
the second last born is 4.3 percentage points higher. However we cannot tell whether this is 
because of actual mining or of mining areas being different from non-mining areas. The 
correlation between living in inactive mining areas and having received at least one vaccine is 
positive, but insignificant. The estimated effect of mining (which here and henceforth refers 
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Table 3: Effect of mining on the last born children’s vaccination probabilities. Within 25 kilometers with and 
without geographical restrictions on the control group.  
Geographical restriction None <200km None <200km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Vaccine Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated Full Vaccinated 
     
active25 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
inactive25 0.021 0.018 0.054*** 0.050*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
muslim 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
     
Observations 243,846 127,008 243,846 127,008 
F test: act25-inact25=0 0.224 0.230 2.985 2.374 
p value 0.636 0.631 0.0841 0.123 
Region and year fixed effects and regional linear time trends are not displayed.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: Effect of mining on the second last born children’s vaccination probabilities. Within 25 kilometers with 
and without geographical restrictions on the control group. 
Geographical restriction None <200km None <200km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Vaccine Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated Fully Vaccinated 
     
active25 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.014 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) 
inactive25 0.018 0.018 0.081** 0.071** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) 
age 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.079*** 0.054*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
muslim 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
     
Observations 89,012 42,796 89,012 42,796 
F test: act25-inact25=0 0.831 0.585 3.467 2.766 
p value 0.362 0.444 0.0626 0.0963 
Region and year fixed effects and regional linear time trends are not displayed.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
to the difference between active and inactive) is not significantly different from zero at any 
conventional significance level. The second regression shows the same analysis when the 
control group is restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. This restriction reduces 
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the correlations between living in mining areas and the probability of having received at least 
one vaccine only slightly. In other words there is little difference in vaccination probability 
between children living 25-200 kilometers from a mine and children living further away. 
The third regression in each table examines the effect of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of being fully vaccinated, without geographical restrictions on the control group.  
Last born children in active mining areas had an estimated 1.8 percentage points higher 
probability of being fully vaccinated. The estimate is significant at the ten percent level. There 
is no significant difference in the second last born. However, the correlation between living in 
a mining area that is not yet active and being fully vaccinated is highly positive and highly 
significant. This difference in vaccination between the mining areas before mining takes place 
and areas further away means that there indeed is selection into being a mining area that is not 
picked up by the regional fixed effects. Last born children in inactive mining areas had an 
estimated 5.4 percentage points higher probability while the estimate for the second last born 
is 8.1 percentage points. The estimated effect of mining is a decline of 3.6 and 6.7 percentage 
points for the last and second last born respectively. These estimates are significant at the ten 
percent level. The fourth regression shows the same analysis when restricting the control 
groups geographically. The correlations are slightly reduced and for the last born children the 
negative effect of mining loses significance at the ten percent level (p-value 0,123). 
The estimated negative effect of mining on the children’s probability of being fully 
vaccinated is driven by the non-infants. Tables A.7 and A.8 in the appendix show the effect of 
mining when separating children younger than one year old (infants) from children one to five 
years old (non-infants). Most infants are actually not supposed to be fully vaccinated. The 
WHO recommendations are that the (first) measles vaccine is administered either at the age of 
nine months or at the age of twelve months, depending on the mortality level in the country. 
The first polio and DPT vaccines are recommended for administration at the age of six to 
eight weeks, with the subsequent doses at intervals of four to eight weeks. The BCG vaccine 
is recommended for administration as soon as possible after birth (WHO, 2013). 
 
The vaccination data used so far includes mother’s self-reported vaccinations of their 
children. The DHS data contains information on whether or not the interviewer has confirmed 
a child’s vaccinations in their vaccination card.  It is clear from the data that children receive 
their vaccination cards only upon vaccination. More than 99 percent of the children with 
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vaccination cards had received at least one vaccine. Therefore, for this sub-sample, the effect 
of mining on the probability of children having received at least one vaccine is not 
investigated. Including the mothers’ self-reported vaccinations would bias the estimates if 
women in mining areas over- or underestimate their children’s vaccinations or if they are 
more or less likely to lie about them compared to the women living further away. Including 
self-reported vaccinations would also bias the results if the women who obtain vaccination 
cards are different in the mining and non-mining areas. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the 
effect of mining on the probability that children were fully vaccinated for the sub-sample of 
children whose mothers could show vaccination cards. The second last born children living in 
inactive areas have a significantly higher probability of being fully vaccinated in this sub-
sample. The estimated effect of mining is negative, but is not significantly different from zero 
at any conventional significance level. The loss of significance is most likely because of the 
reduced sample size. Nevertheless, the estimated negative effect of mining unfortunately fails 
the robustness test of confirmed vaccinations. 
Two additional vaccination measures are analyzed. Table 5 shows the effect of the 
explanatory variables on a mother’s probability of having at least one child that had received 
at least one vaccine and on the probability of all her children being fully vaccinated. The 
control group is restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. Mothers in active mining 
areas had an estimated 1.9 percentage points higher probability to have at least one child that 
had received at least one vaccine. This estimate is significant at the one percent level. There is 
no significant difference between mothers in inactive mining areas compared to those further 
away. The estimated effect of mining is an increase of 1.6 percentage points, but it is 
insignificant. Mothers in active mining areas had an estimated 1.8 percentage points higher 
probability of having all their children fully vaccinated. This estimate is significant at the ten 
percent level. Mothers in inactive mining areas had an estimated 5.5 percentage points higher 
probability of having all their children fully vaccinated. The estimated effect of mining is a 




Table 5: Effect of mining on the probability that a mother has at least one child with at least one vaccine and on 
the probability that all her children are fully vaccinated.  Within 25 kilometers. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES At least one vaccine All Children Fully Vaccinated 
   
active25 0.019*** 0.018* 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
inactive25 0.003 0.055*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) 
age 0.000*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.066*** 0.091*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
muslim 0.049*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
   
Observations 127,008 127,008 
F test: active25-inactive25=0 0.500 3.179 
p value 0.480 0.0746 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.1 Mechanisms 
In the previous subsection the analysis showed statistically significant relationships between 
living in mining areas and vaccination probabilities of children. These relationships may have 
been found because of the effect of mining on the mother’s degree of urbanization, her length 
of education or her employment status which may all influence vaccinations.
21
 In this 
subsection these three possible mechanisms for the relationships are investigated.  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of this analysis for the last and second last born children 
respectively. The control group is restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine in all 
regressions. When urbanization is included in the regression, the positive correlations 
between living in mining areas and vaccination probabilities are reduced. The positive 
correlations are reduced more in active mining areas which implies that urbanization was 
stronger when there was active mining. Urbanization in inactive mining areas may be related 
to mining.  
                                                 
21
 See section 4.1. 
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Including education reduces the estimated impact of urbanization which means that they are 
positively correlated. Its inclusion reduces the correlation between living in active mining 
areas and vaccination probabilities, while it increases the correlation between living in 
inactive mining areas and vaccination. Controlling for women’s employment status has 
negligible impact on the analysis. 
After including the mechanisms, the estimated negative effect of mining on the probability of 
being fully vaccinated increases both in magnitude and significance. The estimated negative 
effect of a mine opening is a decline in probability of 4.3 and 7.6 percentage points for the last 
born and second last born respectively. Both estimates are significant at the five percent level. 
Given the causal relationship between mining and the mechanisms, this is an overestimation 
of the negative effect of mining on vaccination probability. 
Table 6: Effect of mining on last born children’s vaccination probabilities  including the mechanisms. Within 25 
kilometers. 

















         
active25 0.030*** 0.013* 0.012 0.012 0.018* 0.003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
inactive25 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.050*** 0.041** 0.045** 0.043** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
muslim 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
urban  0.085*** 0.070*** 0.071***  0.074*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
schoolyears   0.007*** 0.007***   0.011*** 0.011*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
working    0.017***    0.030*** 
    (0.003)    (0.004) 
         
Observations 127,008 127,008 126,929 126,827 127,008 127,008 126,929 126,827 
F test: ac25-inac25=0 0.230 0.0439 0.00325 0.00717 2.374 3.484 4.604 4.361 
p value 0.631 0.834 0.955 0.933 0.123 0.0620 0.0319 0.0368 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 7: Effect of mining on second last born children’s vaccination probabilities including the mechanisms. 
Within 25 kilometers. 

















         
active25 0.039*** 0.026** 0.024** 0.024** 0.011 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
inactive25 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.071** 0.068** 0.072** 0.070** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
muslim 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
urban  0.057*** 0.044*** 0.046***  0.061*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
schoolyears   0.006*** 0.006***   0.013*** 0.013*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001) 
working    0.028***    0.033*** 
    (0.004)    (0.006) 
         
Observations 42,796 42,796 42,768 42,726 42,796 42,796 42,768 42,726 
F test: ac25-inac25=0 0.585 0.198 0.0815 0.122 2.766 3.655 4.679 4.480 
p value 0.444 0.656 0.775 0.727 0.0963 0.0559 0.0306 0.0343 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.3 in the appendix shows the effect of mining on the probability that a mother has at 
least one child that has received at least one vaccine and on the probability that all her 
children are fully vaccinated with the mechanisms included. Mothers in active mining areas 
are no longer more likely to have at least one child that has received a vaccine. The estimated 
effect of mining on the probability that a mother has all her children fully vaccinated is a 
decline of 4.8 percentage points. This estimate is significant at the five percent level. 
Tables A.4 and A.5 in the appendix show the effect of mining on the probability that the last 
born and second last born children have received the individual vaccines. The control group is 
restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine in all regressions. The numbers after the 
variable names refer to the dose of the vaccine, i.e. “Polio3” is the third and final 
recommended dose of polio vaccination. The analysis suggests that the results are driven 





A major threat to my identification strategy is that of selective migration. Table 8 shows the 
results when the sample is restricted to women who have never moved. Only looking at those 
who have never moved eliminates most problems associated with migration. In all regressions 
the control group is restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine.  
Table 8: Effect of mining on children’s vaccination probabilities for the sub-sample of children whose mothers 
have never moved. Within 25 kilometers. 
 Last Born Children Second Last Born Children 
Restricted to 
non-movers 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 

















         
active25 0.012 0.000 0.045*** 0.035** 0.024** -0.006 0.079*** 0.033 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) 
inactive25 0.010 0.043** 0.016 0.069*** 0.015 0.070** 0.016 0.138*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.032) (0.038) (0.047) 
age 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
christian 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.042*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 0.067*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) 
muslim 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) 
urban 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.094*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.033** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) 
schoolyears 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
working 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.023** 0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
         
Observations 126,827 126,827 39,111 39,111 42,726 42,726 12,494 12,494 
F test: act25-
inact25=0 
0.00717 4.361 1.046 1.553 0.122 4.480 2.257 3.642 
p value 0.933 0.0368 0.306 0.213 0.727 0.0343 0.133 0.0564 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Controlling for migration leads to a substantial increase in the correlation between living in 
mining areas and the probability that children are fully vaccinated. The changes in the 
estimates imply that there is selective inward migration to both active and inactive mining 
areas of women who are less likely to fully vaccinate their children and/or selective outward 
migration of women who are more likely to fully vaccinate their children. Last born children 
in active mining areas are an estimated 3.5 percentage points more likely to be fully 
vaccinated compared to those living further away. This estimate is significant at the five 
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percent level. There is no significant difference found in the second last born children. Last 
born children living in areas where mines are yet to open are an estimated 6.9 percentage 
points more likely to be fully vaccinated while the second last born are 13.8 percentage points 
more likely. The estimated effect of mining is a decline of 3.4 percentage points for the last 
born children, but it is not statistically significant. For the second last born children the 
estimated effect of mining is a decline of 10.5 percentage points. This estimate is almost 
significant at the five percent level. 
The correlation between living in an active mining area and the probability that children have 
received at least one vaccine increases substantially when migration is controlled for. Last 
born children in active mining areas are an estimated 4.5 percentage points more likely to 
have received at least one vaccine compared to those living further away while second last 
born are 7.9 percentage points more likely. Both estimates are significant at the one percent 
level. However the effect of mining fails the F-test at any conventional significance level.  
Table 9 shows the effect of mining on the probability of a mother having at least one child 
that has received at least one vaccine and on the probability that all her children are fully 
vaccinated, for a sub-sample of women who have ever moved. In this sub-sample mothers in 
active mining areas have a significantly higher probability of having at least one child that has 
received at least vaccine. Mothers in active and inactive mining areas have a significantly 
higher probability of having all their children fully vaccinated. The estimated effect of mining 
is an increase of 4.2 percentage points in the probability of a mother having at least one child 
that has received at least one vaccine, and a decline of 3.9 percentage points in the probability 
of her having all her children fully vaccinated. The estimates are not statistically significant at 




Table 9: Effect of mining on the probability that a mother has at least one child with at least one vaccine and on 
the probability that all her children are fully vaccinated.  Within 25 kilometers. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES At Least One Vaccine All Children Fully Vaccinated 
   
active25 0.040*** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.016) 
inactive25 -0.002 0.076*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
age 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.062*** 0.079*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
muslim 0.055*** 0.058*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
urban 0.078*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
schoolyears 0.007*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
working 0.014*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
   
Observations 39,111 39,111 
F test: active25-inactive25=0 2.466 2.096 
p value 0.116 0.148 
Control group restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.3 Different Cutoffs 
The baseline regressions are performed with the mining area defined as a concentric circle 
around a mine of radius 25 kilometers. The narrower the definition of the mining area, the 
larger is the potential difference between the mining and non-mining areas. A narrow 
definition is presumably more likely to capture CSR. The number of women defined as living 
in mining areas decreases rapidly as the geographical restrictions become stricter. 
Table 10 shows the analysis using different cut-offs for the mining area for a sub-sample of 
women who have never moved. The cut-off distances are identified by the different numbers 
after the variables active and inactive. In all regressions the control group is restricted to 




Table 10: Effect of mining on children’s vaccination probabilities using different cut-offs for the mining area. 
Sub-sample of non-movers.  
 Last Born Child Second Last Born Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated 
active5 0.043 0.038 0.034 0.002 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.051) (0.067) 
inactive5 0.026 0.110** 0.014 0.375*** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.088) (0.102) 
Observations 39,731 39,731 12,687 12,687 
p-value act-inact=0 0.748 0.330 0.848 0.00213 
active10 0.055*** 0.043 0.076** -0.040 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.037) (0.046) 
inactive10 0.014 0.092** 0.035 0.327*** 
 (0.034) (0.040) (0.052) (0.067) 
Observations 39,538 39,538 12,632 12,632 
p value act-inact=0 0.305 0.316 0.530 5.24e-06 
active15 0.055*** 0.022 0.078*** 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) 
inactive15 -0.021 0.039 0.010 0.148** 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.046) (0.066) 
Observations 39,474 39,474 12,605 12,605 
p value act-inact=0 0.0880 0.672 0.191 0.0795 
active20 0.043*** 0.033* 0.076*** 0.016 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.031) 
inactive20 -0.011 0.065** -0.011 0.129** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.044) (0.053) 
Observations 39,360 39,360 12,580 12,580 
p value act-inact=0 0.113 0.312 0.0701 0.0660 
active25 0.045*** 0.035** 0.079*** 0.033 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.030) 
inactive25 0.016 0.069*** 0.016 0.138*** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.044) (0.053) 
Observations 39,111 39,111 12,494 12,494 
p value act-inact=0 0.306 0.213 0.133 0.0564 
Active30 0.041*** 0.026* 0.075*** 0.031 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.027) 
Inactive30 0.022 0.055*** 0.011 0.083** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.039) 
Observations 38,905 38,905 12,420 12,420 
p value act-inact=0 0.468 0.255 0.0707 0.267 
Active50 0.028*** -0.003 0.061*** 0.033 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
Inactive50 0.015 0.030 -0.016 0.058* 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030) 
Observations 37,783 37,783 12,064 12,064 
p value act-inact=0 0.533 0.129 0.00366 0.480 
Active75 0.035*** 0.023* 0.031** 0.026 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) 
Inactive75 0.042** 0.034** -0.000 0.035 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) 
Observations 36,808 36,808 11,664 11,664 
p value act-inact=0 0.734 0.537 0.188 0.760 
Control group restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. Region and years fixed effects, regional linear 
time trends and individual specific controls are not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses 




The analysis reveals a statistically significant negative effect of mining on the second last 
born children’s probability of being fully vaccinated up to a cut-off of 25 kilometers. The 
negative effect diminishes with distance from the mines. The same tendency is found in the 
last born children, but the effect is not significant at conventional significance levels. 
The estimated effect of mining on children’s probability of having received at least one 
vaccine is consistently positive, i.e. in the opposite direction to the estimated effect on the 
probability that they are fully vaccinated. While the estimated effect is positive, it does not 
seem to be larger in close proximity to mines. The most significant result is found using a cut-
off of 50 kilometers for the mining area, in which case mining has led to an estimated 7.7 
percentage points increase in the probability of that the second last born children having 
received at least one vaccine. The estimate is significant at the one percent level. 
Table A.9 in the appendix shows the results of this analysis without restrictions on the sample 
and only including controls for the mothers’ age and religious beliefs.  
5.4 Mine Closings 
Table 11 shows the results from an analogous analysis on mine closings when there is no 
control on migration. The second last born children in closed mining areas have a 3.5 
percentage point higher probability of being fully vaccinated. This estimate is significant at 
the five percent level. The estimated effect of a mine closing is an increase of 4.2 percentage 
points in the probability for the second last born to be fully vaccinated. The effect is 
significant at the ten percent level. Table A.6 in the appendix shows the results for the sub-
sample of non-movers. For this sub-sample there are no significant effects from mine 
closings. The most significant effect (p-value of 0.138) is a decline of five percentage points 





Table 11: Effect of mine closings on children’s vaccination probabilities. Within 25 kilometers.  
 Last Born Children Second Last Born 
Children 
All Mothers 
















       
suspended25 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.035** 0.008 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) 
active25 0.012 -0.002 0.023** -0.007 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) 
age 0.001*** 0.005*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.040*** 0.065*** 0.049*** 0.064*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) 
muslim 0.040*** 0.024*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
urban 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
schoolyears 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
working 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Observations 131,006 131,006 44,064 44,064 131,006 131,006 
F test: suspended25-
active25=0 
0.00399 1.160 1.218 3.328 0.140 1.231 
p value 0.950 0.281 0.270 0.0681 0.709 0.267 
Control group restricted to living within 200 kilometers of a mine. Region and years fixed effects, regional linear 
time trends and individual specific controls are not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





6 Discussions and Concluding 
Remarks 
The African continent is considered geologically underexplored (UNECA, 2011), yet many 
African countries are economically dependent on mineral resources today (World Economic 
Forum, 2013) and many market observers believe that metal prices are in an early phase of a 
super cycle (UNECA, 2011). The mineral wealth of the African continent holds the potential 
for vast economic and social progress, but whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing 
is debated. There is empirical evidence both supporting and opposing the existence of a 
natural resource curse. 
Using geo-coded data and a difference-in-difference regression analysis, this thesis provides 
empirical evidence of negative local area effects from large scale mining in sub-Saharan 
Africa between 1990 and 2011. Children in mining areas where mines had yet to open had a 
significantly higher probability to be fully vaccinated compared to children living further 
away. After mineral extraction had begun the relative vaccination advantage decreased. In 
other words large scale mining had a negative local area effect on the quality of the routine 
vaccination program. The negative effect was larger close to mining sites and is statistically 
significant up to the point where the mining footprint area is defined as 25 kilometers. This 
negative effect was partially counteracted by increased urbanization and educational levels 
among women in the mining areas. 
This result is robust to migration, restricting the control group geographically and using 
different geographical definitions of the mining areas. Using the alternative vaccination 
measure of the mother’s probability of having all her children fully vaccinated yields the same 
qualitative results. There is some weaker evidence found of an improvement in the routine 
vaccination program once the mines closed, but this may be because of selective migration. 
The results are not robust to only considering confirmed vaccinations. This is however most 
likely due to sample size issues. 
The reduction in the quality of the routine vaccination program can be interpreted as a 
negative effect on local institutional quality if vaccinations are accepted as a good proxy. As 
such, this thesis represents a contribution to the existing literature on the connection between 
natural resources and institutions. Which dimensions of institutions have been negatively 
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affected by mining is a question that remains unanswered by this study, but related studies, 
both theoretical and empirical, suggests that increased corruption, reduced quality of political 
candidates, government inefficiency, and threatened security may follow mineral extraction or 
windfall income. 
Interestingly, the analysis reveals that the probability that children have received at least one 
vaccine increased as a result of mining. This seemingly conflicting result may be explained by 
what is known as corporate social responsibility (CSR). Mining companies themselves may 
provide vaccinations locally and it is not controlled for in my analysis. CSR may explain the 
results if, instead of just adding to immunization locally, the additional provider in an area 
causes confusion on either the user or the provider side. It is conceivable that the local 
government relies on the mining companies’ health provision for immunization of children in 
the areas where it is in fact in place. If the mining companies’ health provision is, for 
example, less focused on immunization, less well organized or efficient, or if it lacks funding, 
CSR could explain both the reduction in the full vaccination probability and the increase in 
the probability for children to have received at least one vaccine; two providers may 
encompass more children, but the effectiveness and “depth” of immunization is lower. There 
is however an inconsistency in this story. The probability of children having received at least 
one vaccine did not increase nearer mining sites, which suggests that something other than 
CSR is driving the results. 
There are alternative explanations for the results obtained in the analysis. First, migration may 
drive the results also for the non-movers through community effects or a strained local health 
system. Second, the estimated negative effect of mining is largely driven by a disappearing 
advantage in vaccination probability when mines opened. If the increased probability of 
children being fully vaccinated in mining areas before mines opened was caused by pre-
production activity from mining companies, the claim that mining had a negative effect is not 
valid. Instead the interpretation would be that mining caused a temporary local advantage in 
vaccinations. The analysis has revealed selective migration to “inactive” mining areas, which 
suggests that these areas are in fact not so inactive after all. Third, there will always be a 
worry when doing a difference-in-difference analysis that unobserved factors, which have an 
impact on the outcome variables, vary differently over time in the treatment and control 
group. Infrastructure has been identified as a main decision variable for mining companies’ 
investments, it may impact vaccination, and it is not controlled for in my analysis. Regional 
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Table A.1. List of countries and the number of survey participants. 
Country Number of Women 
  
Benin 11,710 
Burkina Faso 41,361 
Burundi 9,389 
Cameroon 29,939 
Central African Republic 5,884 
Congo DR 9,773 






























Table A.2: Effect of mining on the probability for children to be fully vaccinated for a sub-sample of children 
whose mothers could show vaccination cards. Within 25 kilometers. 
 Last Born Second Last Born 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Fully Vaccinated Fully Vaccinated 
   
active25 0.015 0.024 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
inactive25 0.028 0.077** 
 (0.021) (0.036) 
age 0.007*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.066*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
muslim 0.017* 0.023 
 (0.010) (0.018) 
   
Observations 77,199 19,998 
F test: active25-inactive25=0 0.314 1.700 
p value 0.575 0.192 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.3: Effect of mining on the probability that a mother has at least one child with at least one vaccine and 
on the probability that all her children are fully vaccinated including mechanisms.  Within 25 kilometers. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES At Least One Vaccine  All Children Fully Vaccinated 
   
active25 0.005 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
inactive25 -0.003 0.048*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) 
age 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.051*** 0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
muslim 0.038*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
urban 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
schoolyears 0.006*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
working 0.014*** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Observations 126,827 126,827 
F test: active25-inactive25=0 0.159 5.752 
p value 0.690 0.0165 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table A.4: Effect of mining on the individual vaccine probabilities for the last born children. Within 25 
kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Measles BCG Polio1 Polio2 Polio3 DPT1 DPT2 DPT3 
         
active25 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
inactive25 0.014 0.012 0.017 0.038* 0.050** 0.022 0.031 0.052** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
age 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
muslim 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
urban 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.079*** 0.060*** 0.080*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
schoolyears 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
working 0.039*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
Observations 127,817 128,852 129,003 128,853 128,852 128,608 128,446 128,445 
F test: active25-
inactive25=0 
0.0818 0.000257 0.0999 1.645 3.363 0.225 0.637 2.433 
p value 0.775 0.987 0.752 0.200 0.0667 0.635 0.425 0.119 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.5. Effect of mining on the individual vaccine probabilities for the second last born children. Within 25 
kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Measles BCG Polio1 Polio2 Polio3 DPT1 DPT2 DPT3 
         
active25 0.023 0.034*** 0.017 0.010 0.000 0.025* 0.016 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
inactive25 0.040 0.014 0.026 0.048 0.071** 0.023 0.043 0.056* 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
age 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
muslim 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
urban 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.074*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
schoolyears 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
working 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
         
Observations 43,256 43,904 43,993 43,900 43,900 43,747 43,661 43,661 
F test: active25-
inactive25=0 
0.271 0.461 0.0979 1.390 3.884 0.00502 0.539 0.805 
p value 0.603 0.497 0.754 0.238 0.0488 0.943 0.463 0.370 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
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linear time trends are not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.6: Effect of mine closings on outcome variables for a sub-sample of non-movers. Within 25 kilometers. 
 Last Born Children Second Last Born Children Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Any Vaccine Fully 
Vaccinated 








       
suspended25 0.028* 0.031 0.027 0.036 0.022 0.037 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.037) (0.015) (0.023) 
active25 0.046*** 0.033** 0.077*** 0.028 0.041*** 0.034** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.030) (0.011) (0.016) 
age 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) 
muslim 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) 
urban 0.093*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.036** 0.077*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) 
schoolyears 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
working 0.019*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.033*** 0.015*** 0.033*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) 
       
Observations 39,796 39,796 12,714 12,714 39,796 39,796 
F test: suspended25-
active25=0 
0.814 0.00441 2.265 0.0345 1.037 0.0133 
p value 0.367 0.947 0.132 0.853 0.309 0.908 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table A.7. Effect of mining of vaccinations for last born children. By Age. 
 All Infants   Non-infants All Infants Non-infants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
active25 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.021*** 0.018* 0.012 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
inactive25 0.018 0.027 0.013 0.050*** 0.002 0.059** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025) 
age 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* 0.005*** 0.000** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
christian 0.076*** 0.107*** 0.059*** 0.088*** 0.021*** 0.108*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
muslim 0.054*** 0.081*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.009 0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
       
Observations 127,008 40,864 86,144 127,008 40,864 86,144 
F test: active25-
inactive25=0 
0.230 0.354 0.118 2.374 0.322 3.545 
p value 0.631 0.552 0.731 0.123 0.571 0.0598 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed  Infants are under age of one. Non-infants are one year and up. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A.8. Effect of mining of vaccinations for second last born children. By Age. 
 All Infants Non-infants All Infants Non-infants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
active25 0.039*** 0.259*** 0.037*** 0.011 0.097 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.078) (0.011) (0.018) (0.128) (0.018) 
inactive25 0.018 -0.141 0.016 0.071** -0.155 0.074** 
 (0.025) (0.296) (0.025) (0.033) (0.109) (0.033) 
age -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
christian 0.054*** 0.060 0.054*** 0.087*** 0.024 0.090*** 
 (0.008) (0.075) (0.008) (0.011) (0.069) (0.011) 
muslim 0.046*** 0.031 0.046*** 0.049*** -0.055 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.095) (0.011) (0.013) (0.069) (0.013) 
       
Observations 42,796 647 42,149 42,796 647 42,149 
F test: active25-
inactive25=0 
0.585 1.692 0.553 2.766 2.104 3.071 
p value 0.444 0.194 0.457 0.0963 0.147 0.0797 
The control group is restricted to living within 200 km of a mine. Region and year fixed effects and regional 
linear time trends are not displayed  Infants are under age of one. Non-infants are one year and up. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 






Table A.9: Effect of mining on children’s vaccination probabilities using different cut-offs for the mining area. 
No restrictions. 
 Last Born Child Second Last Born Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated Any Vaccine Fully Vaccinated 
active5 0.042 0.030 0.056 -0.010 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.046) 
inactive5 0.097*** 0.148*** -0.000 0.138 
 (0.030) (0.045) (0.084) (0.094) 
Observations 247,614 247,614 90,225 90,225 
p-value act-inact=0 0.170 0.0367 0.543 0.156 
active10 0.055*** 0.042** 0.042* -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.031) 
inactive10 0.077*** 0.123*** 0.015 0.198*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.046) (0.058) 
Observations 246,452 246,452 89,865 89,865 
p value act-inact=0 0.463 0.0558 0.595 0.00142 
active15 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.050*** 0.037* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
inactive15 0.014 0.036 -0.016 0.062 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.049) 
Observations 245,835 245,835 89,652 89,652 
p value act-inact=0 0.324 0.964 0.0771 0.637 
active20 0.035*** 0.027** 0.040*** 0.020 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) 
inactive20 0.004 0.042* -0.003 0.066* 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) 
Observations 245,186 245,186 89,449 89,449 
p value act-inact=0 0.268 0.531 0.182 0.263 
active25 0.032*** 0.018* 0.043*** 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) 
inactive25 0.021 0.054*** 0.018 0.081** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.032) 
Observations 243,846 243,846 89,012 89,012 
p value act-inact=0 0.636 0.0841 0.362 0.0626 
Active30 0.035*** 0.021** 0.049*** 0.031** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) 
Inactive30 0.016 0.046*** 0.001 0.052* 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) 
Observations 242,701 242,701 88,632 88,632 
p value act-inact=0 0.357 0.180 0.0615 0.490 
Active50 0.022*** 0.011 0.033*** 0.030** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
Inactive50 0.012 0.033** -0.021 0.033 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) 
Observations 236,423 236,423 86,664 86,664 
p value act-inact=0 0.543 0.173 0.00605 0.876 
Active75 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.019** 0.031** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
 0.026* 0.034*** -0.000 0.038** 
Inactive75 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) 
Observations 232,090 232,090 84,799 84,799 
p value act-inact=0 0.937 0.371 0.244 0.725 
Region and years fixed effects, regional linear time trends and individual specific controls are not shown. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
